Traditional, quantitative behavioral geneticists and developmental psychobiologists such as Gilbert Gottlieb have long debated what it would take to create a truly developmental behavioral genetics. These disputes have proven so intractable that disputants have repeatedly suggested that the problem rests on their opponents' conceptual confusion; whilst others have argued that the intractability results from the non-scientific, political motivations of their opponents. The authors provide a different explanation of the intractability of these debates. They show that the disputants have competing interpretations of the concepts of reaction norm, genotype-environment interaction, and gene. The common thread that underlies each of these disagreements, the authors argue, is the relevance of potential variation that is not manifest in any actual population to the understanding of development. r
It was the late Gilbert Gottlieb who first asked us to look at this topic from the perspective of the history and philosophy of science, and this paper is dedicated to him. Thanks also to David Moore and Kenneth Schaffner for reading earlier drafts and providing us with valuable feedback.
Introduction
Throughout his career the eminent student of behavioral development Gilbert Gottlieb was critical of traditional, quantitative behavioral genetics, which he saw as fundamentally incapable of addressing the real questions about the causal mechanisms of behavioral development. In later years, his criticism came to focus on the ambitions of behavioral geneticists to create a 'developmental behavioral genetics.' In the next section we outline Gottlieb and his opponents' competing visions of what would be needed to create a genuinely developmental behavioral genetics. We situate this disagreement in the broader context of other long-standing disputes about the value and limits of traditional, statistical behavioral genetics. These disputes have been so intractable that disputants have repeatedly suggested that they are not genuine empirical disputes, but arise instead from their opponents' lack of terminological or conceptual clarity. We review two such 'meta-debates,' one about the norm of reaction concept and one about the concept of genotype-environment interaction. We suggest that the existing literature on both these topics is unsatisfactory. It fails to identify the real differences between how the two groups of scientists conceptualize their shared subject matter. The key issue in both cases, we suggest, is the epistemological relevance of potential variation that is not manifest in any actual population. Towards the end of the paper we suggest that the disputants have different conceptions of genes and gene action, one that draws attention to this 'silent variance,' and one that excludes it from consideration. An important part of Gottlieb's legacy, we suggest, should be the recognition that a truly developmental behavioral genetics must study potential as well as actual differences. Finally, we turn to the debates over the social implications of this research, noting how such considerations have shaped the theoretical debates. We reject the view that the intractability of debates over behavioral genetics has no intellectual causes, and merely reflects left-wing obstinacy in the face of facts. Instead, we claim that much of the intractability has arisen from a lack of conceptual clarity concerning the issues we diagnose in the earlier sections.
A tale of two disciplines (and a disputed border)
A discipline such as traditional (quantitative) behavioral genetics may be defined either methodologically or sociologically (Hull, 1988, p. 393) . Methodologically, traditional behavioral genetics consists in the application of quantitative genetic methods to behavioral phenotypes. These methods were initially developed by figures such as R. A. Fisher, J. B. S. Haldane, Sewall Wright, and George Udny Yule in order to integrate the Mendelian model of inheritance with the existing, biometrical tradition in the study of natural selection (Provine, 2001) . In 1918, R. A. Fisher published his seminal ''The Correlation between Relatives on the Supposition of Mendelian Inheritance'' (Fisher, 1918) . In the process of demonstrating the compatibility of Mendelian and biometrical models, Fisher also introduced a new statistical concept-variance (Box, 1978, p. 53) . The concept was of interest to Fisher because it seemed to offer him a means of quantifying genetic differences and environmental differences and establishing how much each contributed to total phenotypic variation for a trait in a population. Much of Fisher's career was spent developing statistical methods such as the analysis of variance (ANOVA), tests of statistical significance, and the design of experiments, all with the goal of answering this how-much question about the relative contributions of nature and nurture. This focus on relative contributions would become a defining methodological feature of quantitative behavioral genetics.
From a more sociological perspective, the emergence of behavioral genetics can be dated to around 1960 (Fuller & Simmel, 1986; Plomin & McClearn, 1993; Whitney, 1990) . The date is chosen to recognize the publication of John Fuller and William Thompson's Behavior Genetics. ''The time seems ripe,'' the authors stated in the preface, ''for a modern treatment of the division of knowledge we have called 'behavior genetics.' (Fuller & Thompson, 1960, p. v) . A textbook-style treatment, Behavior Genetics introduced the basics of cellular, genetic, and population biology; the methods of inbreeding, ANOVA, and twin studies; and the applications to personality, intelligence, and mental disorders. The pivotal disciplinary event occurred a decade later, in 1970, with the creation of the journal Behavior Genetics, along with the founding of the Behavior Genetics Association with Russian-American geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky as its first president.
In later years, advances in molecular biology facilitated the investigation of the role that genes played in the development of a phenotype at the molecular level. When the focus was on humans, however, ethical considerations largely confined behavioral geneticists to traditional quantitative genetic methods. Thus, classic twin and adoption studies were employed to evaluate the relative contributions of different sources of variation, along with gene-hunting studies, which track the distribution of genetic markers in families (linkage studies) or populations (association studies) in an attempt to seek out candidate genes associated with behavioral traits.
While behavioral genetics is a clearly defined field, both intellectually and institutionally, developmental behavioral genetics is less a field than an aspiration. Understanding the role of genes in behavioral development is clearly amongst the most important desiderata for contemporary life and social science, but it is far from clear what kinds of studies will yield this understanding, whether this issue defines a single field with a distinctive set of methods, and how such a field would relate to traditional behavioral genetics. The most straightforward vision of developmental behavioral genetics involves the application of the traditional behavioral genetic methods to developmental data, that is, to repeated observations of the same phenotype at different stages of development-the study of ''distributions of individuals developing across time'' as Sandra Scarr has characterized the field (Scarr, 1995, p. 158) . The behavioral geneticist Robert Plomin has defined developmental behavior genetics in similar terms as ''the study of genetic and environmental influences on individual differences in behavioral development'' (Plomin, 1983, p. 253) . Scarr argued that developmental behavioral genetics should resemble traditional behavioral genetics in seeking the causes of phenotypic differences, rather than the causes of phenotypes, and also in asking how much phenotypes depend on certain causes, rather than how they depend on them (see also Plomin, 1983, p. 254; Scarr, 1992 Scarr, , 1993 Scarr, , 1995 . These methodological stipulations have been used for over 50 years to defend traditional behavioral genetics against the accusations that (1) it does not yield causal explanations and (2) it cannot explain phenomena at the individual, as opposed to the population, level. It was Scarr's aim to insulate the proposed new discipline from the same accusations, and to insist that within the stipulated limits it will yield genuine answers to genuine questions about behavioral development. Thus, for example, developmental behavior genetics according to Scarr is a discipline that sets out to explain how much of the observed differences between the developmental trajectories of children can be attributed to genetic differences, to differences in shared and non-shared environment, to correlations between genes and environment, and so forth.
This vision of a developmental behavioral genetics was fiercely rejected by Gottlieb and by others in the neighboring discipline of developmental psychobiology. Developmental psychobiology emerged in the 1960s from earlier work on behavioral development by comparative psychologists such as Theodore C. Schneirla and his student Daniel S. Lehrman. The International Society for Developmental Psychobiology was founded in 1967 and a journal of the same name followed in 1968. The term 'psychobiology' has been used in diverse ways in the past century, but usually with the intention of preventing some psychological phenomenon from disappearing in the enthusiasm for a successful reductionistic research strategy (Dewsbury, 1991) . 'Developmental psychobiology' denotes just such an integrative, multi-disciplinary approach to behavioral development, seeking to integrate genetic analysis with behavioral embryology and the evolutionary study of animal behavior (e.g. Michel & Moore, 1995) . The inclusion of animal behavior research in this synthesis points to another of the field's historical roots, in the rapprochement between ethology and comparative psychology in the 1960s (e.g. Hinde, 1966) . Developmental psychobiology might thus be interpreted as the study of behavioral development in the spirit of Niko Tinbergen's (1963) program for the biology of behavior, according to which the 'four questions' of the mechanistic causes of behavior, of developmental causation, of the ecological role of behavior, and of its evolution are to be answered (and, indeed, posed) in the light of one another.
According to developmental psychobiologists like Gottlieb, the prefix 'developmental' can only be meaningfully attached to behavioral genetics if it abandons the traditional methodological restrictions discussed above, which focus on the causes of variation responsible for individual differences. The new discipline must set out to elucidate the causal mechanisms of behavioral development rather than quantify differences in behavioral development, and must ask how genes cause development rather than how much development genes cause. Traditional, quantitative genetic methods are fundamentally unsuited to the study of the causal role of genes in development because they analyze and explain phenomena at the level of the population and not the individual organism, and because they explain the differences between individuals, rather than how those individuals came to have the phenotypes that they do (see also Ford & Lerner, 1992; Gottlieb, 1995 Gottlieb, , 2003 . But to advocates of the statistical vision of developmental behavioral genetics, these criticisms simply confuse different scientific questions that can, and should, be kept apart.
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This general line of argument has been applied to two of Gottlieb's points in particular: his rejection of the concept of the 'reaction range,' and his insistence on the ubiquity of genotype-environment interaction in nature. It is to these specific disputes that we now turn.
The reaction what? Norms, ranges and development
If one or more genotypes are reared in a range of environments and tracked for the value of a particular phenotype, then this information may be graphically depicted by means of phenotypic curves. Fig. 1 depicts two such curves for genotypic varieties of Drosophila melanogaster. Joseph Krafka (1920) measured low-bar stock and ultra-bar stock for the number of eye-facets (y-axis) across a range of temperatures (x-axis), and Lancelot Hogben (Hogben, 1933 , see Section 3 below) utilized this data to graph the curves in the figure.
What information is revealed in such graphs? As it turns out, answering this question has been the source of some controversy. Developmental psychobiologists have tended to employ the concept of a reaction norm (or norm of reaction), while quantitative behavioral geneticists have tended to employ the concept of a reaction range.
Gottlieb, in a target article criticizing the 'conceptual deficiencies in developmental behavior genetics,' pointed to the employment of the reaction range as one such deficiency: ''Gottesman's notion of reaction range sets strict and predictable upper and lower limits for a genotypey.The norm of reaction, in contrast, holds that a knowledge of phenotypic ARTICLE IN PRESS outcome under one or many rearing conditions does not allow one to predict the outcome when novel rearing conditions are encountered'' (Gottlieb, 1995, pp. 134-135 ; see also Gottlieb, 2003) . Gottlieb defended this particular distinction with an historical argument, referencing Steve Anderson Platt and Charles A. Sanislow III who had criticized the conflation of these two concepts by behavioral geneticists and argued that they had separate origins and separate meanings (Platt & Sanislow III, 1988) . The reaction range, they claimed, was introduced in the 1960s by behavioral geneticist Irving I. Gottesman (1963a) and implied that the phenotype was deterministically restricted within a certain range by the genotype; while the reaction norm was introduced in the 1950s by Dobzhansky (1955) and placed no such genotypic limits on development.
Gottesman and his colleagues Eric Turkheimer and H. Hill Goldsmith commented on Gottlieb's target article and offered a different interpretation of the relationship between the reaction norm and the reaction range (Turkheimer, Goldsmith, & Gottesman, 1995) . The reaction norm was a theoretical entity, they argued, whilst the reaction range described the difference between minimum and maximum phenotypic values for a given phenotype in the tested environments. ''A reaction range is thus an empirical characteristic of a reaction norm'' (p. 143). As a result, they argued, the reaction range is no more linked with deterministically set upper and lower limits on the phenotype than is the reaction norm (p. 144).
This debate over the reaction norm and the reaction range involved a number of issues: the meaning of the terms, the historical lineages of those meanings, and the extent to which those meanings incorporated genetically fixed limits. We will now take a closer look at the history. As we will see, the separate concepts actually had a common origin, so the work will be to identify that origin and then trace the bifurcation in the concepts that followed.
As Sahotra Sarkar (1999) has shown, research on phenotypic curves can be traced back to the beginning of the twentieth century in the work of Richard Woltereck (1909) . Sarkar has tracked the emergence, neglect, and then acceptance of the norm of reaction concept by Western geneticists from 1909 to 1960. To address the issues raised by the debate between Gottlieb and his critics, however, we must examine a slightly later period. Platt and Sanislow (1988) claimed that the indeterministic reaction norm and the deterministic reaction range derived independently from Dobzhansky (1955) and Gottesman (1963a) ; this may be called the Platt-Sanislow thesis. But in actuality, both reaction norms and reaction ranges were discussed in Dobzhansky's contributions to evolutionary genetics during the 1950s. As early as 1950, Dobzhansky wrote with E. W. Sinnott and L. C. Dunn in their Principles of Genetics (Sinnott, Dunn, & Dobzhansky, 1950) that ''What a genotype determines is the reactions, the responses, of the organism to the environmenty. These potentially possible or actually realized phenotypes constitute the range of reaction of a given genotype. In practice, one is never certain that the entire range of reaction of any genotype is known'' (p. 22, emphases added). The discussion with Sinnott and Dunn was framed in terms of the reaction range; but in his Genetics and the Origins of Species a year later, Dobzhansky (1951) told his readers that the total range of phenotypes which a genotype could engender is allowed to develop in all possible environments was the genotype's norm of reaction (p. 20). Moreover, ''Whatever change is induced in the phenotype, this change is of necessity within the norm of reaction circumscribed by the genotype; and yet, the genotype is neither unchangeable nor independent of the environment'' (p. 21, emphasis added). By 1951, then, Dobzhansky had introduced both terms to evolutionary genetics. If there was any doubt about the relationship between these two terms for Dobzhansky, that issue was resolved in the next edition of the Principles of Genetics, where the authors wrote, ''The diverse phenotypes that may arise from the interplay between a given genotype and various environments in which this genotype may live constitute the norm, or range, of reaction of that genotype'' (Sinnott et al., 1950, p. 24, emphasis added) . In contrast to the Platt-Sanislow thesis, then, it is clear that Dobzhansky introduced both terms, reaction norm and reaction range, during the 1950s. Moreover, Dobzhansky did not introduce them to apply to different phenomena; rather, he treated them synonymously, as the last quotation makes apparent (see also Falk, 2001, p. 130) . Sometimes he used the one; sometimes he used the other; and sometimes he used both.
But if reaction norm and the reaction range were originally synonymous terms, how did the two ideas ever get pulled apart? This is where Gottesman enters the story. In 1963, Gottesman introduced the concepts of reaction norm and reaction range to the behavioral genetics community (Gottesman, 1963a) . He explained, ''For our purposes the best way to conceptualize the contribution of heredity to intelligence is to think of heredity as determining a norm of reaction (Dobzhansky, 1955) or as fixing a reaction range'' (p. 254). With the terms out of the way, he continued, ''Within this framework a genotype determines an indefinite but circumscribed assortment of phenotypes, each of which corresponds to one of the possible environments to which the genotype may be exposed'' (p. 254). Gottesman considered as an example four human genotypes (''a group of mongoloids'' (A), a group of ''garden variety defectives'' (B), an average group (C), and a ''group of superior genotypes'' (D)) raised in an array of variably favorable environments and measured for IQ (Fig. 2) . The familiar lines of the phenotypic curves were present for all four genotypes, but Gottesman also specified the concept of the reaction range (as ''RR'') as referring to the particular range of phenotypic variation exhibited by each genotype in the environmental array. 
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The quoted paragraph and example it contained became a standard motif in Gottesman's subsequent writings, and it will be useful for our purposes to trace their evolution. Gottesman wrote another article later in 1963 which repeated the point, but with a slight variation: ''For our purposes the best way to conceptualize the contribution of heredity to a personality trait is in terms of heredity's determining a norm of reaction (Dobzhansky, 1955) or of fixing a reaction range (Gottesman, 1963a) '' (Gottesman, 1963b, p. 2) . Finally, compare this with the passage 3 years later, where Gottesman wrote, ''For our present purposes, it will be sufficient to conceptualize the contribution of heredity to personality trait variation in terms of heredity's determining a reaction range'' (Gottesman, 1963a (Gottesman, , 1966 . This final version, with Dobzhansky expunged from the story, was reproduced in subsequent publications (see, for example, Gottesman, 1974; Gottesman & Heston, 1972) , and the reaction range as explicated by Gottesman quickly became a standard concept in the behavioral genetics and psychological literature in subsequent decades (Benson, 1992; Platt & Sanislow III, 1988) .
We may now take stock of this history and bring it to bear on the 1995 exchange between Gottlieb and Turkheimer, Goldsmith, and Gottesman. In contrast to the Platt-Sanislow thesis, there were not separate origins for the terms 'reaction norm' and 'reaction range,' both were introduced by Dobzhansky in the 1950s. Gottesman, however, in taking Dobzhansky's contribution and introducing the concepts to the behavioral genetics community, redefined the reaction range, breaking the synonymy and specifying the reaction range as the difference between the minimum and maximum values of a measured phenotypic curve. We may thus make a distinction between reaction range in Dobzhansky's sense and reaction range in Gottesman's sense (call this RR G ). 1 We can then advance a revised form of the Platt-Sanislow thesis, whereby the distinction is between the reaction norm or the reaction range in its original sense on one hand, and Gottesman's revised concept of RR G on the other.
Having clarified the history of Gottesman's RR G and Dobzhansky's equation of the terms 'reaction range' and 'norm of reaction,' we can ask if either has a stronger connotation that there are genetically fixed limits to behavioral development. The short answer is, ''No.'' Gottesman certainly did speak of heredity as ''fixing'' and ''determining'' the reaction range. But he was by no means alone in using such language. Dobzhansky too claimed that the genotype ''determines'' the reactions of the organism to the environment, and that the norm of reaction was ''circumscribed by the genotype.'' Dobzhansky emphasized the qualification that such determination or circumscription was specific to the particular environments tested, and that other environments might be encountered or interventions might be developed, which could lead to phenotypic outcomes outside the current reaction range. But Dobzhansky was not alone in adding these qualifications. Gottesman also specified the reaction range of a phenotypic curve as applying to specified environments. There was nothing, then, inherently deterministic or indeterministic about either concept.
This does not mean, however, that there was no substance to the disagreement between Gottlieb (1995) and Turkheimer et al.(1995) about whether RR G was a valuable scientific concept. The norm of reaction, or reaction range in Dobzhansky's original sense, was a theoretical entity that encompassed not only manifest variation, but potential variation Fuller, Sarkar, and Crews (2005, p. 447) have suggested a similar distinction between a broad-sense reaction range (analogous to Dobzhansky's) and a narrow-sense reaction range (analogous to Gottesman's). which had not yet been expressed. Turkheimer et al. saw this as limiting the scientific utility of the norm of reaction concept: it would never be practical to expose each genotype to the full range of possible environments and so we could never know the full norm of reaction. In contrast, RR G , whatever its theoretical limitations, was an operational concept. It is often reasonable to extrapolate an observed linear relationship between gene and phene (Turkheimer et al., 1995, p. 147) , and so within some range of environments we can be reasonably sure what can and cannot be achieved. This limited but valuable understanding of the genetic potential of the system, they argued, should not be thrown out like the baby with the bathwater merely because it was not a total understanding (Turkheimer et al., 1995, pp. 147-152) .
To see why Gottlieb did not share this view, we must remember that he advocated the experimental investigation of the causal basis of behavioral development. From this point of view it seemed far less utopian to seek to determine the full norm of reaction. A causal model will both narrow down the class of environmental variables that affect the trait and allow us to plug any possible values into the model. In effect, a well-confirmed causal model of the development of a trait embodied the full norm of reaction of that trait. Moreover, abnormal environments, even those in which the organism cannot be reared to maturity, were a powerful experimental tool with which to confirm such a causal model.
Thus, we suggest that the dispute between Gottlieb and Turkheimer et al. is fundamentally about the epistemological relevance of merely potential variation, variation that is part of the norm of reaction, but not part of the reaction range according to Gottesman's sense of the concept. For Turkheimer et al., potential outcomes in unobserved environments were a distraction from the task of drawing what conclusions we validly can from the observations we actually have. From this perspective, RR G was the useful scientific concept, whilst the reaction norm merely embodied a utopian ideal of total knowledge. Indeed, the last and largest part of Turkheimer et al.'s reply was a forceful exposition of just how hard it would be to meet Gottlieb's demand for a full causal model of behavioral development.
For Gottlieb, in contrast, understanding behavioral development meant understanding the causal structure that responded with different outcomes to different environments. All parts of the full norm of reaction, including those parts that are never realized in nature, were epistemologically relevant in the sense that they were all potential tests of a causal model. In contrast, the realized reaction range (RR G ) was a superficial measure that confounded the causal structure of the system with the particular parameter settings found in extant populations. The reaction norm was, from this perspective, the more useful scientific concept. The next section will show that the same difference in perspective rested at the heart of the better-known dispute about the meaning of 'interaction'.
Two concepts of interaction: G Â E B and G Â E D
Why do some people develop a complex trait such as antisocial behavior, whilst others do not? Notice that this inquiry incorporates a question about the causal mechanisms responsible for the individual development of antisocial behavior, as well as a question about the causes of variation responsible for individual differences in antisocial behavior. This distinction between the causes of individual development and the causes of individual differences has been focus of the best-known dispute between developmental psychobiologists and behavioral geneticists.
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It is a truism that genes and the environment interact during the course of individual development. But the traditional focus of quantitative behavioral genetics has not been on the causal-mechanical interplay between genes and the environment during the developmental process; it has been instead on the relative contributions of genotypic and environmental differences to the total phenotypic variation of a particular trait in a particular population. The standard behavioral genetic methodology for investigating relative contributions is the statistical ANOVA. In its simplest form, ANOVA partitions total phenotypic variation for a trait V P into a contribution attributable to genotypic variation V G and a contribution attributable to environmental variation V E :
In this simple case, the two sources of variation are additive, meaning just that V G and V E together fully account for the total phenotypic variation. However, when the genotypic variation is dependent on the environmental distribution, and the environmental variation is dependent on the genotypic distribution, V G and V E become interdependent. This interdependence is known as genotype-environment interaction, or G Â E; it creates a potential problem for ANOVA because G Â E generates its own source of variation V G Â E , ensuring the break down of the additivity in Eq.
(1) and requiring a modification that results in Eq. (2):
Another way to understand the difference between Eqs. (1) and (2) is with reference to the graphs of phenotypic curves discussed in the last section. When V G and V E are additive as in Eq. (1), then the phenotypic curves (G1 and G2) will be parallel across the environment, as is the case in Fig. 3(a) ; however, when there is V G Â E as in Eq. (2), then the curves will not be parallel across the environment, as is the case in Fig. 3(b) and was the case in the empirical example graphed in Fig. 1 .
Notice that we have now introduced two concepts of interaction: (a) the causalmechanical interaction between genes and the environment during individual development, and (b) the interaction between genotypic and environmental sources of variation in a population. Gottlieb (2003) has emphasized the importance of recognizing the genetic and environmental relationship in a developmental-i.e., causal-mechanical-sense, stressing the idea of bidirectional gene-environment co-action in individual development. This developmental interconnectedness, Gottlieb claimed, ensures that G Â E is the rule, not the exception (Gottlieb, 2003, p. 343) . Behavioral geneticists, however, have argued that it is a conceptual error to introduce considerations about the causal mechanisms of development into discussions of G Â E in the study of individual differences. Educational psychologist Arthur Jensen made this point in the 1970s during what came to be called the 'IQ Controversy.' Jensen had used ANOVA to conclude that a gap in average IQ scores between blacks and whites was due to genetic differences (Jensen, 1969) . When critics appealed to the interaction between genes and the environment during the course of individual development, Jensen replied that, '''interactionism' has become merely a substitute for extreme environmentalismy. Thus the interactionist theory holds that although there may be significant genetic differences at the time of conception, the organism's development involves such complex interactions with the environment that the genetic blueprint, so to speak, becomes completely hidden or obscured beneath an impenetrable overlay of environmental influences'' (Jensen, 1973, p. 49) . ''This position,'' Jensen continued, ''has arisen from a failure to understand the real meaning of the term 'interaction' as it is used in population genetics; but even more it is the result of failure to distinguish between (a) the development of the individual organism, on the one hand, and (b) differences among individuals in the population' ' (1973, p. 49) .
This argument, which may be called the defense-by-distinction, quickly became the standard response of behavioral geneticists and their defenders to critics like Gottlieb: ''Unfortunately, discussions of genotype-environment interaction have often confused the population concept with that of individual development. It is important at the outset to distinguish genotype-environment interaction from what we shall call interactionism, the view that environmental and genetic threads in the fabric of behavior are so tightly interwoven that they are indistinguishable'' (Plomin, DeFries, & Loehlin, 1977, p. 309) . ''It is common for theorists of the heredity Â environment controversy to confuse the statistical concept of interaction with a viewpoint called interactionism. The problem arises because each concept applies at a different level of analysis'' (Bouchard & Segal, 1985) .
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Employers of the defense-by-distinction deployed phrases such as ''the population concept,'' ''the statistical concept,'' and ''the real meaning of the term 'interaction''' to contrast the contribution of G Â E to population-level individual differences with the interaction between genes and the environment during individual development. This conception of genotype-environment interaction as a product solely of the populationbased statistical methodologies that test for it will be called the biometric concept of genotype-environment interaction, or G Â E B . It can be traced back all the way to Fisher, who was the first to wrestle with the complications posed by G Â E for ANOVA (Fisher & Mackenzie, 1923) . G Â E B persisted within the field of population genetics as it developed throughout the middle of the twentieth century in the research of scientists such as Jay Lush (1937) . When the tools of population genetics were appropriated for behavioral genetics, G Â E B entered that discipline as well (Tabery, 2007, in press ).
But G Â E B was never the only concept of G Â E. Lancelot Hogben, like Fisher, a British biologist and statistician, understood G Â E to be a product of differences in unique developmental combinations of genotype and environment. Hogben (1932, p. 201) first introduced this idea in 1932, when he criticized the ''false antithesis of heredity and environment,'' and argued that, in addition to hereditary variation and environmental variation, there also existed a third class of variability, which ''arises from the combination of a particular hereditary constitution with a particular kind of environment'' (p. 98). A year later, Hogben brought this issue to Fisher's attention in correspondence while preparing for his William Withering Memorial Lectures at the University of Birmingham. Hogben introduced to Fisher the Krafka (1920) data used in Fig. 1 above and explained to Fisher, ''What I am worried about is a more intimate sense in which differences of genetic constitution are related to the external situation in the process of development.'' 3 Hogben's notion of genotype-environment interaction as a product of differences in unique developmental combinations of genotype and environment will be called the developmental concept of genotype-environment interaction, or G Â E D . Like G Â E B , the concept of G Â E D also persisted throughout the twentieth century. But it was developmental geneticists, such as Conrad H. Waddington (1957) , rather than population geneticists, who kept this concept in currency (Tabery, 2007, in press ).
We may now take stock of this history and bring it to bear on the debate over G Â E. In contrast to the reaction norm and reaction range concepts, which were traced to a common origin in the work of Dobzhansky and only later came to be distinguished, G Â E B and G Â E D had two distinct origins in the work of Fisher and of Hogben. The use of the defense-by-distinction, then, may be seen as just one of the more recent instantiations of the tension between the biometric and the developmental concepts of G Â E. Those who used the defense-by-distinction contrasted the ''real meaning of the term 'interaction''' with what they took to be muddleheaded ''interactionism.'' But G Â E D is not muddleheadedness. It is an alternative, entirely coherent conception of G Â E. Gottlieb's emphasis on incorporating elements of individual development in discussions of G Â E simply puts him alongside developmental biologists such as Hogben and Waddington, who always understood G Â E to be a product of the causal mechanics of individual development. 4 But if development is always the result of a web of causally interacting genetic and environmental factors, then a puzzle arises. Behavioral geneticists regularly detect large main effects for genes and fail to identify a high level of statistical interaction between genes and environment. 5 One explanation is that their methods have a systematic tendency to underestimate interaction effects (Wahlsten, 2000) . Evolutionary explanations, drawing on concepts like the canalization of adaptively important developmental outcomes, might also be offered. But let us grant that, whilst G Â E D is ubiquitous, the study of individual differences in natural populations often reveals surprisingly low levels of G Â E B . These data would not convince those with Gottlieb's theoretical orientation that development is not fundamentally interactive. This reflects a difference in how they, as opposed to a traditional behavioral geneticist, conceptualize the subject matter. For a traditional behavior geneticist G Â E B is interaction, and if this element of the variance is low there is See Tabery (2007) for an account of how G Â E B and G Â E D may be integrated based upon understanding interaction as the interdependence of difference-makers in development that take different values in the natural world. 5 Sesardic has attacked critics of behavioral genetics for relying on one or two famous examples of G Â E B and almost seems to imply that there are no others (Sesardic, 2005) . But the literature on non-human species, in which experimental intervention is more likely to be ethically acceptable, is replete with examples (For reviews, see T. Fuller et al., 2005). little interaction. For Gottlieb, interaction is fundamentally a property of causal networks of material entities (G Â E D ), and G Â E B is the statistical manifestation of actual differences in the genotype-environment combinations that shape the development of each individual. Since we know on direct, biological grounds that development is interactive, the failure to detect statistical interaction in the development of particular outcomes simply tells us that the developmental system is structured so as to render those developmental outcomes insensitive to variation in certain parameters (via mechanisms such as redundancy and feedback). Instead of concluding that there is no interaction, developmentalists argue that we need to find interventions that will reveal it, such as using experimental interventions to drive parameters to values that would not be encountered in nature. As we saw in the previous section, traditional behavioral genetics emphasizes the practical value of the conclusions we can derive from the variation we actually observe. In contrast, scientists like Gottlieb insist that the ultimate practical goal must be causal understanding; for this purpose, potential variation-even to extents not normally encountered in nature-is as important as actual variation.
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Two conceptions of genes and gene action
Previous sections have highlighted two conceptual issues that help to explain the persistent tendency of advocates and critics of traditional behavioral genetics to talk past one another. In this section we consider a third source of miscommunication: different ways of conceptualizing genes and gene action. Agreement about the fundamental, ontological grounding of genetics in DNA is not enough to create a shared conceptualization of the gene. Behavioral geneticists, and quantitative geneticists more generally, conceptualize genes in classical, Mendelian terms as intervening variables in the genetic analysis of phenotypes. In contrast, many critics of developmental behavioral genetics, especially those with a background in developmental psychobiology, conceptualize genes as determinants of the value of a developmental parameter in the context of a larger developmental system (we will refer to these constructs as 'developmental genes'). Although both sides would pick out the same specific DNA sequence elements (in most cases at least) if they had sufficient information about the molecular basis of a trait, in the absence of that information they have conceived genes very differently.
Let us examine these two conceptualizations of the gene in more detail. The gene was always a postulated physical unit of heredity. At a practical level, however, the genes of classical genetics were intervening variables that allowed prediction of the phenotypes of offspring from the phenotypes of parents. The aim of genetic analysis was not to test the theory of the gene, but to answer other biological questions using that theory (see the detailed reconstructions in Waters, 2004). Quantitative characters, like height and weight, which vary continuously between individuals, posed a significant problem for early geneticists, since only a character with discrete values can appear in Mendelian ratios in offspring. However, as early as 1918, Fisher had shown that statistical procedures for studying correlations between phenotypes could be interpreted in Mendelian terms. In the simplest models of this kind, quantitative traits are treated as if they were the effect of a large number of genes each of which makes an equal contribution to variation in the character. The attitude of the geneticist to these postulated Mendelian 'genes' is like the attitude we have toward 'centers of mass' in physical theory. Centers of mass are mathematical devices. It would be merely foolish to look for them as additional
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constituents of matter alongside protons, neutrons, and the rest. Nevertheless, what we know about how matter is actually constituted justifies us introducing these entities into our calculations. In just the same way, whether we can identify specific DNA segments corresponding to the 'genes' discussed in Fisher's proofs is simply not germane to the validity of the quantitative genetic results he derived. If the Mendelian framework is broadly correct then results derived by postulating these 'genes' will be reliable.
The identification of DNA as the genetic material and the ongoing elucidation of its structure and function have had the result that the dominant meaning of 'gene' in contemporary scientific usage is a DNA sequence which is transcribed to produce a messenger RNA molecule that in turn is processed to produce a protein or a functional RNA. But this does not mean that the traditional, Mendelian conception of the gene has been or can be replaced by this molecular conception (Griffiths & Stotz, 2006 , 2007 . Geneticists continue to make use of classical genetic techniques to identify regions of chromosome in which molecular genes may be located. Even when the explicit aim of this work is to identify molecular genes, the conceptualization of the gene that is actually used to do the work is the classical, Mendelian conception. This is shown by the fact that wellconducted work of this kind, free from experimental error or errors of reasoning may locate a candidate gene or genetic locus that does not correspond to a molecular gene, but instead to some other functional DNA element, such as an untranscribed regulatory region. Some abnormalities in human limb development, for example, are associated with mutations in a gene on human chromosome 7. But recent research suggests that the gene in which the mutation is located plays no role in the development of these abnormalities (Lettice et al., 2002) . Instead, embedded in that gene is a sequence of DNA that acts to regulate sonic hedgehog (Shh), a gene located about one million nucleotides away on the same chromosome. It is likely Shh that is involved is the relevant aspects of limb development. But it is no criticism of the original research which found the 'gene for' these abnormalities that what it found was, in another sense, not a gene. Biologists have no difficulty thinking in Mendelian terms when applying traditional genetic techniques, and switching seamlessly to the molecular conception of the gene when examining the DNA sequences they have located. Now imagine that a behavior geneticist reports having located a 'gene for' a psychiatric disorder. One way to interpret the report is as a prediction that a sequence straightforwardly encoding a protein or a functional RNA-a molecular gene-will be found at that locus. But it is equally legitimate to interpret the report as evidence that something about that locus makes a heritable difference to the disease phenotype. If the eventual annotation of the sequence at that locus does not identify a molecular gene relevant to the disease phenotype, this need not show that the earlier work was flawed. All that is required is that the annotation identifies some sequence element that is a difference maker with respect to the disease phenotype. The traditional, Mendelian gene concept is alive and well and it would be intellectually crippling to insist on using only the molecular concept in genetic research (Griffiths & Stotz, 2006 , 2007 Weber, 2004) .
If traditional behavior genetics conceives genes primarily as Mendelian alleles, how have its critics conceived them? Whilst recent work in developmental psychobiology has begun to link the parameters of developmental models to the expression of specific coding sequences in the genome (e.g. Meaney, 2001; Suomi, 2003) , for most of the history of this research tradition such genes have been purely hypothetical. It has not been possible to manipulate specific genetic parameters of the developmental system in the same way as specific environmental parameters. This may have produced an environmentalist bias in empirical results, if not in conceptual framework. Any such bias is rapidly being corrected now that it is practical to intervene at the molecular level, for example by unmethylating genes which were methylated as a result of earlier life experience (Weaver et al., 2005) . But until very recently, although developmental psychobiologists conceived of genes as mechanistic causes of development, the lack of direct access to these causes led them to appear in representations such as Fig. 4 above as purely hypothetical determinants of the value of certain parameters of a developmental model.
The use of hypothetical genes in developmental models can be traced back at least to the attempts of embryologists to integrate genetics into their discipline in the 1930s. If it is assumed that the biochemical processes of phenogenesis are the result of gene action, then some or all of the parameters of a developmental model can be labeled as 'genes.' It is in this sense that Julian Huxley speaks of 'rate genes' determining certain parameters of his models of relative growth (Huxley, 1972 (Huxley, (1932 ). These hypothesized genes have no empirical foundation besides the allometric model itself and the general conviction that an organism's biochemistry is an expression of its genes. Similar hypothetical genes appear in Waddington's classic representation of development as a complex system whose parameters are genetic loci and whose state space is a set of phenotypic states (Waddington, 1940 , 1957 . The state space is depicted as a surface, each point of which represents a phenotype. The genetic parameters are depicted as pegs that pull on the surface and thus determine its contours. Epistatic interactions between loci are represented by links between the cords by which those loci pull on the surface. The development of an organism over time is represented by the movement of a ball over the surface, which is dictated by gravity, so that the ball rolls downhill on a path dictated by the contours of the surface. The development of the organism is thus represented by its trajectory over the surface, through successive phenotypic states.
The vision of development represented by Gottlieb's diagram (Fig. 4 ) differs in several fundamental respects from Waddington's (Fig. 5) , adding non-genetic parameters and emphasizing bidirectional causation, but it treats the genetic parameters themselves in the same way, as the locus of action of hypothetical developmental genes.
The 'molecularization' of all branches of biology, including developmental psychobiology, means that purely hypothetical genes of this kind are now largely restricted to fields such as 'artificial life,' which are primarily concerned with model building. But until very recently, developmental psychobiology was restricted to hypothetical developmental genes and the contrast between this way of thinking about the genetic basis of behavior and the Fig. 4 . 'Co-action' of genes and environment (from Gottlieb, 1992, p. 186). quantitative behavior genetics way of thinking about the genetic basis of behavior has been another source of mutual misunderstanding.
Mendelian alleles and hypothetical developmental genes are both legitimate ways to introduce DNA sequences into two, very different theoretical contexts. 6 The explanatory role which the 'gene' plays in those two contexts is importantly different. The presence of a ARTICLE IN PRESS Waddington's 'developmental landscape,' from Waddington (1957, p. 36). 6 These two ways of thinking have obvious similarities to Lenny Moss's (2003) distinction between Gene-P (statistical predictor of phenotype) and Gene-D (material gene with intrinsic template capacity). However, Moss contrasts a concrete Gene-D with an abstract Gene-P, and suggests that the phenotypic multi-potentiality of a Gene-D results from its being defined by its intrinsic nature and not by its contextually mediated effects, as Gene-P is. In contrast, both the conceptualizations of the gene outlined here are abstractions from the molecular detail, and the phenotypic multi-potentiality of the 'hypothetical developmental gene' results from the structure of the developmental system of which it is a part. hypothetical developmental gene, by its very nature, explains a particular phenotype via the mediation of many other developmental parameters. In contrast, the Mendelian allele for a phenotypic difference, by its very nature, explains that difference without reference to other developmental parameters. The hypothetical developmental gene is defined as the factor that plays such-and-such a role in relation to the other parameters of the developmental model. The introduction of a specific gene into a developmental model is justified by reference to the ability of the model as a whole to explain the effects of manipulations of its various parameters. In this context, explaining the presence of a phenotype by reference to the presence of a particular gene means drawing attention to how that particular genetic parameter interacts with the other parameters. The same point applies to explanations of phenotypic differences, which in this context draw attention to how a particular change in the genetic parameter ramifies through the system. But explanations of phenotypes in terms of the presence of Mendelian alleles do not share these features. The presence of a Mendelian allele explains the presence of the associated phenotypic difference because of the statistical association between alleles and phenotypes in a pedigree or a population. The epistemological value of this relationship derives precisely from the fact that it is robust across the actual distributions of other developmental parameter settings in the population from which it is derived and in which it can be legitimately extrapolated.
Thus, the hypothetical developmental gene explains by reference to the developmental system as a whole, whilst the Mendelian allele explains by importing statistical information about specific alleles and phenotypes from some reference class. We do not think that this is just another way of stating the truism that Mendelian genetics explains phenotypic differences and not phenotypic states in themselves. Although the presence of a Mendelian allele can only explain a phenotypic difference, the state of a hypothetical developmental gene can explain a phenotypic difference as well as explaining an individual phenotype. In the context of a suitable developmental model, the distribution of values of a genetic parameter can explain the distribution of phenotypic states in a population, and thus the differences between one individual and another. But unlike an explanation in terms of which Mendelian alleles each individual possesses, an explanation that references the state of a hypothetical developmental gene is a causal, developmental explanation which works by laying out the interaction of this specific genetic parameter with the system as a whole.
7
If we conceive of genes simply as parameters in a developmental model, then it will seem unsatisfactory to explain the presence of a phenotype or a phenotypic difference by alluding to the presence of a particular gene in the absence of any understanding of its role in development. The fact that a developmental gene has a specific phenotypic effect immediately raises the question why it has had that effect rather than other effects it might have had if other parameters were different, and thus directs attention to those other parameters. Conversely, if we conceive of genes as Mendelian alleles, then it will seem unreasonable to demand knowledge about how a gene interacts with other genes and with the environment before accepting an explanation of a phenotypic difference which simply cites the presence of this allele. If the organism or organisms whose phenotypes are to be explained have been drawn from a suitable reference class, then the facts that caused the gene to be cited as an explanation imply that those other parameters will not make a difference. How, then, can they be explanatorily relevant?
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7 Tabery (2007) gives an account of these explanations in terms of 'difference mechanisms'.
Our suggestion is, then, that claims that 'the mere presence of a gene' cannot in itself explain a phenotypic difference reflects a conception of the gene as something other than a Mendelian allele. If the explanation which is subject to this criticism is one that makes use of the traditional, Mendelian conception of the gene and which is strictly targeted at explaining a difference between two individuals in a specified population, then the criticism is unfair. Conversely, the claim that developmental parameters which do not account for any of the actual variance seen in a population are irrelevant to an explanation of trait differences seems to us to misunderstand the developmental conception of the gene and the nature of the explanations which feature genes so conceived. The 'silent' parameters are relevant because they confer on the other parameters the causal powers in virtue of which they account for some proportion of the variance. Thus, as in the previous two sections, questions about the epistemological relevance of possible but non-actual variation seem to underlie some of the disagreements between developmental psychobiologists and behavioral geneticists.
Causes of controversy: conceptual confusion or political motivation?
The debate over the validity of biometrical techniques for the study of heredity has been politicized since its inception. Fisher's interest in the subject was avowedly in the service of his preferred version of eugenics, and neither Hogben nor Haldane made any secret that they were concerned about the social implications of relying on these techniques in domains in which, they alleged, the techniques do not give reliable results. The technical issues which divided hereditarians and their critics in the IQ debates of the late 1960s and 1970s were identical to those identified by Fisher and Hogben, but because they were discussed primarily in the context of alleged racial differences in intelligence, the debate was a great deal more heated. The critics of hereditarianism in this period included Richard Lewontin, Noam Chomsky, and others who made no secret of the fact that they believed that the research they criticized was certainly racist in substance and perhaps carried out with a racist agenda. Hereditarians like Arthur Jensen and Richard Herrnstein were no more backward in claiming that critics of their work were not genuinely concerned about its scientific validity, but merely seeking to censor science in the pursuit of their progressive political agendas. Comparisons with Nazi race science were met by comparisons with Stalin's suppression of 'Morgano-Mendelism' (Joravsky, 1970) .
As a result of this history of politicized debate, it has become difficult to address methodological and conceptual issues in behavioral genetics without being aligned with one or the other side of what is taken to be primarily a political and not an intellectual debate. Even the strictly scientific literature in behavioral genetics is littered with references to the ideological motivations of the researcher's opponents. The philosopher Neven Sesardic has recently claimed that there is no substance to the issues canvassed in Sections 2 and 3 above and that the entire discipline of philosophy of science has a structural bias against hereditarian explanations (Sesardic, 2005, see especially pp. 207-208) . While no one can deny that many participants in these debates have their eyes primarily on the ethical and political consequences of research, we disagree strongly with Sesardic's conclusion that the inability to settle these issues reflects nothing more than the unshakeable, environmentalist bias of critics of traditional, quantitative behavioral genetics. We believe that behind the apparent repetitions of the exact same criticisms and replies, almost suggesting that the authors can write but not read, and behind the mutual caricaturing, stand intellectual disagreements that are both deep and important, but have been marred by the lack of conceptual clarity which we detailed in the previous sections.
We suggest that one reason people have become so ready to accuse one another of covert political motives in this arena is the fact that behind some of the apparently semantic disagreements over the use of words like 'interaction' are the genuine, conceptual issues highlighted above. Opponents who appear to be using terms ambiguously and refusing to accept what are intended to be clarifying distinctions, like that between statistical interaction and 'interactionism,' may instead be trying to use language in a way that reflects their own way of conceptualizing the subject, in this case trying to keep on the table the possibility that merely potential causes of variance are relevant to the explanation of differences. Unable to get their opponents to accept what seems to them an unarguable point, or to use a distinction that will clarify the debate, the competing discussants are reduced to seeking a non-intellectual explanation for their resistance. If our analysis is correct, it may be possible to take some of the heat out of these debates by elucidating the different starting points that lead workers from different traditions to see one another as misguided or confused.
